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THE INFLUENCE OF LIABILITY LAW ON FOOD SAFETY 
ON PREVENTIVE EFFECTS OF LIABILITY CLAIMS AND LIABILITY 
INSURANCE 
 
Tetty Havinga 
 
Abstract 
Most research on food safety has focused on direct forms of food safety regulation.  
This paper explores product liability law as a driver of food safety measures in firms. Its 
purpose is to widen the debate on liability law to include discussion of the actual impact on 
firm behaviour. Liability law is assumed to promote food safety. The author distinguishes three 
ways in which liability law could act as an incentive for firms to implement enhanced food 
safety controls: liability claims, liability insurance and direct effects of liability law on man-
agement strategy. The paper concludes that the assumption that liability laws make firms 
sensitive to the prevention of food safety risks is too optimistic. However, liability law could 
stimulate a culture within firms to take responsibility for food safety. Existing economic and le-
gal analysis would gain from a sociological analysis of the actual impact of liability on com-
pany decisions. 
 
Key words 
Liability law, food safety, food industry 
INTRODUCTION 
The food supply in countries such as the US, the UK and the Netherlands is con-
sidered safe. Nevertheless, each year millions of people become ill after 
eating contaminated food. It is estimated that 5 000 Americans, 687 people in 
England and Wales and 80 people in the Netherlands die from food-born ill-
nesses each year.1 Food-born diseases are much more common. Significant 
                                         
1  Estimates for the United States are from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 
available on the internet at <http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/EID/vol5no5/mead.htm> (last 
accessed on 4 April 2010), based on Paul S. Mead et al., Food-Related Illness and 
Death in the United States, 5 Emerging Infectious Diseases (1999) 5, at p. 607); for Eng-
land and Wales: Goutam K. Adak, G.K., Sallyanne M. Meakins, Hopi Yip et al.,. Disease 
Risks from Foods, England and Wales, 1996-2000, 11 Emerging Infectious Diseases 
(2005) 3, pp. 365-372, available on the internet at <www.cdc.gov/eid> (last accessed 
on 4 April 2010); for The Netherlands from the RIVM, A.H. Havelaar, Y.T.H.P. Van Duyn-
hoven & W. Van Pelt, Microbiologische ziekteverwekkers in voedsel, Omvang van het pro-
bleem, Nationaal Kompas Volksgezondheid, available on the internet at <http://www. 
rivm.nl/vtv/object_document/o3617n22451.html> (last accessed on 18 November 
2009). However, an EFSA document mentions just 32 deaths in the European Union in 
2008, available at <http://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/scdocs/doc/s1496.pdf> (last ac-
cessed on 1 September 2010). 
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sources of food infections include bacteria (e.g., Salmonella, Escherichia coli, 
Clostridium, Campylobacter, Listeria), parasites and viruses (e.g., Norovirus). 
Other causes of food-born illness include toxins (e.g., nitrate, acrylamide), 
metals, prions (variant Creuzfeldt-Jacob disease) and allergens. Most illness is 
attributed to the consumption of poultry, processed foods and red meat. 
Consumers are able to prevent some of these risks. An unhealthy diet (too 
much sugar, trans-fat, alcohol and too little fruit and vegetables) is considered 
a more significant risk to public health than unsafe food. Moreover, problems 
related to the food security in developing countries and sustainable food pro-
duction are socially more important than safe food. Nevertheless, food safety 
should receive the continuing attention of governments, food producers, 
retailers, cooks and consumers. Safe food is food without micro-organisms, che-
micals or other substances in quantities that are harmful to human health. 
The traditional methods of regulating food have come under pressure as a 
result of food safety incidents, the BSE crisis, the development of „new‟ foods 
such as GM food and functional foods, and growing concerns for animal wel-
fare, sustainability and unhealthy food consumption in many EU countries. Trust 
in traditional regulation and regulators has decreased. In addition, command-
and-control regulation in general has been critised as being ineffective, too ex-
pensive and leaving too much responsibility for the government.2 The increasing 
internationalisation of food production chains has resulted in a growing need 
for global and transnational regulation.3 
                                         
2   Christopher Ansell & David Vogel, „The Contested Governance of European Food Safety 
Regulation‟, in: Christopher Ansell and David Vogel (eds) What’s the beef? The contested 
governance of European Food Safety (Cambridge MA : MIT Press 2006),  pp. 3-32; Neil 
Gunningham and Darren Sinclair, „Regulatory pluralism: Designing policy mixes for 
environmental protection‟, 21 Law and Policy (1999) 1, pp. 49-76; M.A. Hajer, J.P.M. 
Van Tatenhove & C.  Laurent, Nieuwe vormen van Governance. Een essay over nieuwe vor-
men van bestuur met een empirische uitwerking naar de domeinen van voedselveiligheid en 
gebiedsgericht beleid, RIVM rapport 500013004/2004, available at the internet at 
<http://www.maartenhajer.nl/upload/RIVM.pdf> (last accessed on 21 September 
2010); Steve Jaffee and Oliver Masakure,‟ Strategic use of private standards to en-
hance international competitiveness: Vegetable exports from Kenya and elsewhere‟, 30 
Food Policy (2005), pp. 316-333. 
3   Doris Fuchs, Agni Kalfagianni & Tetty Havinga, „Actors in Private Food Governance: The 
Legitimacy of Retail Standards and Multistakeholder Initiatives with Civil Society Partici-
pation‟, Agriculture and Human Values (in press 2010, available on the internet from 
August 2009 at <http://www.springerlink.com/content/m237228605223463/full-text. 
pdf> (last accessed at 21 September 2010); Peter Oosterveer, Global Food governance. 
(PhD-Thesis Wageningen University, Wageningen 2005); Jacques Trienekens & Peter 
Zuurbier, „Quality and safety standards in the food industry, developments and 
challenges‟, 113 International journal of production economics (2008), pp. 107-122. 
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Such developments have led to changes in the regulation of food. Food 
safety is on the political agenda in the European Union and many countries.4 In 
response to real or perceived food safety risks, food regulation became 
stricter. New forms of regulation have achieved prominence (such as retailer-
led food standards and transnational food certification schemes) and national 
government agencies are changing their ways. Many of these new forms of 
governance are characterised by a mix of public and private organisations 
involved in rule-making, compliance monitoring and enforcement. The central 
role of state institutions has declined and more is expected from the food in-
dustry itself. Food regulation is increasingly becoming a transnational affair. 
Many private food standards are used throughout the world and the European 
Union has enlarged its competences and increased its activities.5 
Food regulation includes not only national and international government 
regulation, but also such non-government regulation as private certification 
schemes (MSC or GlobalGap), and public-private partnerships. We can distin-
guish between direct and indirect forms of food safety and quality regulation 
(see figure 1).6 Direct regulation entails prescriptions and requirements for the 
production and handling of food to assure the production of safe food. Even 
though indirect regulation does not provide prescriptions for the production 
process and the product, it is nevertheless expected to act as an incentive for 
implementing food safety controls. An example of indirect regulation is the set-
ting of skill requirements for persons who prepare food so that food is pre-
pared hygienically. Product liability law is another example of indirect regu-
lation.  
 
                                         
4   Ansell & Vogel, „Contested Governance‟, supra note 2; Michelle Everson & Ellen Vos, 
„European Risk Governance in a Global Context‟, in: Ellen Vos (ed.), European Risk Gov-
ernance. Its Science, its Inclusiveness and its Effectiveness (Connex Report Series, Nr. 06 
2008), pp. 7-36, , available on the internet at <http://www.mzes.uni-mannheim.de/pro-
jekte/typo3/site/fileadmin/BookSeries/Volume_Six/CONNEX%20Report%20Series%2
0Book%206.pdf > (last accessed on 13 September 2010); Katharina T. Paul, Food 
safety: a matter of taste? Food safety policy in England, Germany, the Netherlands, and at 
the level of the European Union (PhD University of Amsterdam 2009); Henry Rothstein, 
Precautionary Bans or Sacrificial Lambs? Participative Risk Regulation and the Reform of 
the UK Food Safety Regime (LSE Discussion paper 15, London 2003); John Spriggs and 
Grant Isaac, Food safety and International Competitiveness: The case of Beef (Oxford/ 
New York :Cabi publishing 2001). 
5   Ansell & Vogel, „Contested Governance‟, supra note 2; Everson & Vos, „European Risk 
Governance in a Global Context‟, supra note 4; Fuchs, Kalfagianni & Havinga, „Actors in 
Private Food Governance‟, supra note 3. 
6  Compare the distinction between direct regulation and product liability as forms of 
public systems of food quality control in Spencer Henson and Julie Caswell, „Food safety 
regulation: An overview of contemporary issues‟, 24 Food Policy (1999), pp. 589-603, at 
p. 593. 
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Figure 1: Types of regulation of food safety 
Source of the 
rules  
Nature of the rules 
 
Direct 
 
Indirect 
 
Public 
 
 
Food laws, e.g. Food Safety Act 
1990 (UK) and General Food Law7 
(EU) 
 
Product liability laws 
TBT-GATT agreement8 
 
Public-private 
 
Industrial hygiene codes 
 
Insurance policies 
 
Private 
 
 
 
Private food safety certification 
schemes (e.g. GlobalGap, MSC) 
 
Consumer complaint 
proceedings 
 
Most research has focused on direct forms of food safety regulation. Studies 
have been published on reforming food laws and their implementation and 
enforcement.9 Recently, both public regulatory arrangements as well as the 
rise, legitimacy and working of non-government, direct food safety regulation 
has received attention.10 As Roe points out, though, the influence of liability law 
has received less attention.11 
                                         
7  Commission Regulation (EC) No 178/2002 laying down the General Principles and Re-
quirements of Food Law, Establishing the European Food Safety Authority and laying 
down procedures in matters of food safety, OJ 2002 L31/1-24. 
8  GATT Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT). 
9   E.g. Peter Mascini & Eelco Van Wijk, „Responsive regulation at the Dutch Food and Con-
sumer Product Safety Authority: An empirical assessment of assumptions underlying the 
theory‟, 3 Regulation & Governance (2009) 3, pp. 27-47 (doi:10.1111/j.1748-
5991.2009.01047.x); Paul, Food safety: a matter of taste?, supra note 4; Rothstein „Pre-
cautionary bans‟, supra note 4; Spriggs & Isaac, Food Safety and international competi-
tiveness, supra note 4. 
10   Linda Fulponi, „Private voluntary standards in the food system: The perspective of major 
food retailers in OECD countries‟, 31 Food Policy (2006), pp. 1-13, available on the 
internet at <www.elsevier.com/locate/foodpol. science direct>; Tetty Havinga, „Private 
regulation of food safety by supermarkets‟, 28 Law and Policy (2006) 4, pp. 515-533; 
Spencer Henson & Thomas Reardon, „Private Agri-food standards: Implications for food 
policy and the agri-food system‟,  30 Food Policy (2005) 3, pp. 241-370; Terry 
Marsden, Andrew Flynn & Michelle Harrison, Consuming interests. The social provision of 
foods (London: UCL press 2000); Marian Garcia Martinez, Andrew Fearne, Julie A. 
Caswell et al., „Co-regulation as a possible model for food safety governance: Op-
portunities for public-private partnerships‟, 32 Food Policy (2007 ), pp. 299-314; Henry 
Rothstein, „Escaping the Regulatory Net: Why Regulatory Reform Can Fail Consumers‟, 
27 Law and Policy (2005) 4, pp. 520-548; Frans Van Waarden, „Taste, Tradition, 
Transactions, and Trust: The public and private regulation of food‟, in: Christopher Ansell 
& David Vogel (eds), What’s the beef? The contested governance of European Food Safety 
→ 
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This paper explores the opportunities available for product liability to 
encourage food safety measures within firms. Its aim is to contribute to the 
discussion of the role public and private actors may play in providing an 
effective food safety system. The paper starts with a brief introduction to pro-
duct liability law. The next section discusses the assumed influence of liability 
law on food safety based on the legal and economic literature. I distinguish 
three ways in which liability law could act as an incentive for firms to implement 
enhanced food safety controls: liability claims, liability insurance and direct 
effects of liability law on management strategy. The subsequent sections 
present available empirical evidence on the actual impact of liability law re-
lated to these three incentives. The paper concludes with a summary of the 
findings and a discussion of the role of liability law in food safety regulation.  
PRODUCT LIABILITY LAW 
Liability for defective products was introduced in European Community Law in 
1985.12 This Directive is based on the principle of liability without fault. Every 
producer must compensate any damage caused by a defect in his product to 
the physical well-being or property of individuals, independently of whether or 
not there is negligence on the part of the producer. The burden of proof lies 
with the victim, who has to prove the damage, the defect and the causal 
relationship between the defect and the damage. A product is defective when 
it does not provide the safety which a person may expect. In 1999 the scope 
of product liability was extended to include unprocessed primary agricultural 
products.13 Since that time, the Directive has applied to both industrial products 
and agricultural products. Suppliers are not liable under this Directive. This 
Directive is subsequently implemented in national legislation of the Member 
States.14 
                                         
(Cambridge MA: MIT Press 2006), pp. 35-59; Frans Van Waarden, „Governing global 
commons: Public-private-protection of fish and forests‟, in: Jo Swinnen, Jan Wouters et al. 
(eds.) Private standards and global governance. Legal and economic perspectives 
(Cheltenham: Edgar Elgar 2010 in press). 
11   Brian Roe, „Optimal sharing of foodborne illness prevention between consumers and in-
dustry: the effect of regulation and liability‟, 86 American Journal of Agricultural Eco-
nomy (2004) 2, pp. 359-374, at p. 360. 
12   Council Directive 85/374/EEC on the approximation of the laws, regulations and ad-
ministrative provisions of the Member States concerning liability for defective products, 
OJ 1985 L 210/29. 
13 Council Directive 99/34/EC amending Council Directive 85/374/EEC on the ap-
proximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States 
concerning liability for defective products, OJ 1999 L 141/20. 
14   An overview of the national provisions concerning Directive 1999/34/EC on the ap-
proximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States 
concerning liability for defective products is available on the internet at <http://eur-
→ 
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The European Commission stresses that the Directive must maintain a 
balance between the concerns of consumers and producers.15 Research into the 
product liability systems in the Member Sates revealed that the prevailing view 
among consumer representatives was that the Directive does not adequately 
protect the interests of consumers.16 
The Directive has two goals. Existing disparities in liability regimes may dis-
tort competition and affect the free movement of goods in the community. The 
Directive also seeks to protect consumers from damage caused by defective 
products. The Commission explains: „The Directive helps to increase the level of 
protection against defective products for two reasons: first, it encourages pro-
ducers to do their best to produce safe products by complementing the regula-
tory measures of a given product group or those following the Directive on 
General Product Safety 92/59 and second, once these preventive measures 
have failed and accidents have happened, it allows the victims to obtain 
redress from the producers.‟17  
ASSUMED IMPACT OF LIABILITY LAW ON FOOD SAFETY 
MEASURES 
Liability law has two aims: compensation for damages and the prevention of 
accidents caused by unsafe products. Liability law establishes the right of a 
person harmed by an unreasonablly dangerous product to seek compensation 
in court for damages from the other party. The primary function of liability law 
is to compensatie the victim and achieve corrective justice between the parties. 
However, a preventive function is also generally attributed to liability law.18 
Dewees, Duff and Trebilcock distinguish between three goals: deterrence, 
compensation, and corrective justice.19  
                                         
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:71999L0034:EN:NOT #FIELD_NL> 
(last accessed on 20 September 2010). 
15  Report from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament and the European 
Economic and Social Committee, Third report on the application of the Council Directive 
on the approximation of laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member 
States concerning liability for defective products (85/374/EEC of 25 July 1985, amend-
ed by Directive 1999/34/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 May 
1999), Com (2006) 496 final. 
16  Lovells, Product liability in the European Union. A report for the European Commission 
(London : Lovells, Markt/2001/11/D 2003). 
17  Report from the Commission on the application of Directive 85/374 on Liability for De-
fective Products, COM (2000) 893 final, p. 10. 
18  Matteo Ferrari, Risk Perception, Culture, and Legal Change.  A Comparative Study on Food 
Safety in the Wake of the Mad Cow Crisis (Franham/Burlington: Ashgate 2009), p. 89. 
19  Louis Visscher, „De preventieve werking van het onrechtmatige-daadsrecht. Empirisch on-
derzoek naar de werking van aansprakelijkheidregels‟, 17 Recht der Werkelijkheid 
(2002) 1, pp. 59-74.  
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Legal writers tend to concentrate on claims for compensation; they discuss 
liability doctrines, case law and the interpretation of legal provisions: What is 
a product? Who is a producer? What counts as proof of a causal connection 
between product and damage? What defences can be presented? and so on. 
Legal authors generally merely assume that firms will try to avoid being held 
liable. The assumption is that the enforceable duty to pay damages in case of 
negligence will cause the actor to take avoiding action.20 The deterrent effect 
of sanctions will prevent hazardous acts. 
Writers in the field of economics, on the other hand, tend to focus on the 
impact of liability laws on firms‟ preferences and costs and on the effects of 
these shifting preferences and costs. Potential liability is considered as anti-
cipated costs and firms will optimise their food safety precautions to minimise 
the total costs of production.21 Faure and Hartlief argue that the basic pre-
sumption of liability laws is that they contribute to the prevention of accidents.22 
It is assumed that prospective liability deters a company from neglecting the 
harms and risks their product may cause. An offender, who will subsequently 
have to pay damages, will act with care beforehand. The fear of future ex-
pensive lawsuits is believed to encourage food producers to make food safer. 
In the food economics literature, product liability law is seen as one of three 
factors that together encourage food firms to adopt food safety measures, 
along with market forces and food safety laws and regulations (figure 2).23 
 
  
                                         
20   Ivo Giesen, „Attributie, juridische causaliteit en preventieve werking. Over causaliteitstoe-
rekening vanuit psychologisch perspectief en de mogelijke gevolgen daarvan voor (de 
preventieve werking van ) het aansprakelijkheidsrecht‟, in: Willem Hendrik Van Boom, 
Ivo Giesen & Albert J. Verheij (eds), Gedrag en privaatrecht. Over gedragspresumpties en 
gedragseffecten bij privaatrechtelijke leerstukken (Den Haag: Boom Juridische Uitgevers 
2008), at p. 187. 
21  Jean C. Buzby, Paul D. Frenzen & B. Rasco, Product liability and microbial foodborne illness 
(Washington DC: Food and Economics Division, Economic Research Service, U.S. Depart-
ment of Agriculture, Agriculture Economic Report, no. 799 2001) at p. 9; Spencer Henson 
& Neil H. Hooker, „Private sector management of food safety: Public regulation and the 
role of private controls‟, 4 The International Food and Agribusiness Management Review 4 
(2001) 1, pp. 7-17; Louis T. Visscher, Een rechtseconomische analyse van het Nederlandse 
onrechtmatigedaadsrecht (Den Haag: Boom juridische uitgevers 2006). 
22  Michael G. Faure & Ton Hartlief, Verzekerbaarheid van nieuwe gezondheidsrisico’s: achter-
grondstudie (Zoetermeer: Raad voor volksgezondheid en zorg 2001), available on the 
internet at <www.rvw.net> (last accessed on 19 March 2007) at p. 16; Michael Baram, 
„Liability and its influence on designing for product and process safety‟, 45 Safety 
Science  (2007) 1-2, pp. 11-30. 
23   Buzby, Frenzen & Rasco, „Product liability and microbial foodborne illness‟, supra note 
21; Henson & Hooker, „Private sector management of food safety‟, supra note 21. 
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Figure 2: Factors that encourage food safety measures in firms 
Market Firms that produce unsafe food risk losing their reputation, 
markets share and sales. 
 
Food safety laws 
and regulations 
Firms that violate food laws risk penalties imposed by 
courts or inspectorates, such as fines, product recalls or 
plant closure 
 
Product liability 
law 
Firms that are legally responsible for a product that has 
made people ill risk having to pay compensation to the 
victims as well as court costs and legal fees 
Source: Buzby, Frenzen & Rasco, Product liability and microbial foodborne illness, 2001, supra 
note 20. 
 
In analysing the economic determinants of food safety controls by supermar-
kets, Henson and Northen consider the legal distribution of liability between 
different actors in the value chain as one of the key variables.24 Marsden et al. 
argue that establishing legal liability for food safety might improve safety by 
providing incentives for producers to follow such practices as minimise risks.25  
Both economics and legal authors agree that liability law provides eco-
nomic incentives for firms to avoid actions that may violate the law or pose 
food safety risks. 
THREE TYPES OF PREVENTIVE EFFECT 
We have seen that product liability law is thought to have a potential impact 
on how food firms manage food safety and food hygiene. Most authors pay 
attention only to the deterrence effect of prospective claims for damages. 
Meidinger identifies tort liability on the public side and the insurance industry 
on the private side as powerful drivers of private safety regulation, giving 
manufacturers an interest in showing due care and the insurance industry an 
interest in controlling the risks.26  
                                         
24   Spencer Henson & James Northen, „Economic Determinants of Food Safety Controls in 
Supply of Retailer Own-Branded Products in United Kingdom‟, 14 Agribusiness (1998) 2, 
pp. 113-126, at p. 117. 
25   Terry Marsden, Robert Lee, Andrew Flynn et al., The New Regulation and Governance of 
Food. Beyond the Food Crisis? (New York/London : Routledge New York/London 2010), 
at p. 263. 
26   Errol Meidinger, „Private Import Safety Regulation and Transnational New Governance‟, 
in: Cary Coglianese, Adam Finkel & David Zaring (eds) Import Safety: Regulatory Gover-
nance in the Global Economy, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press 2009), 
pp. 233-253, at p. 234. 
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Theoretically, there are three ways in which liability law could induce pre-
ventive measures (see figure 3). 
1.  Claims from injured consumers or damaged business relations may in-
fluence firms‟ preferences and costs, inducing them to assure food safety 
and thus forestall liability claims. The threat of lawsuits serves as a stimulus 
to the industry to improve its practices. This is a special effect of liability 
law. 
2.  A second route is through insurance. Firms may cover the risks of liability 
claims by insuring the risk. The effect of insurance is not obvious. Insurance 
companies may induce food safety controls through the terms of an insur-
ance policy or by calibrating premiums according to the level of precaution 
taken. However, insurance could also limit the economic incentives for firms 
to produce safe food by taking over the financial risk. The impact of in-
surance companies can either be related to a particular claim or not. 
3.  Finally, liability law may influence business management strategies directly 
(i.e. not through claims or insurance), inducing businesses to assure food 
safety. We might call this the general effects of product liability law.  
 
Quite often, the preventive effects of liability law are linked to claim litigation. 
However, in studying the effects of legislation, it is important not to study the 
effects in particular conflict situations only, because the social effects of legis-
lation are not confined to those situations. Effective legislation induces people 
to comply with rules in everyday life without discussion and conflicts. Actors then 
change their routines and behaviour and apply legal rules without intervention 
from the judicial system, in the form of enforcement agencies, judges or law-
yers. Griffiths points out the importance of these general effects, which are also 
included in this paper, viz.,the influence of legislation in everyday practice in 
organisations subject to the law.27 General effects are the opposite of special 
effects – effects in particular conflicts, where people refer to the law, and rules 
are applied by legal institutions, such as a court. 
 
                                         
27   John Griffiths, „The social working of anti-discrimination law‟, in: Titia Loenen & Peter R. 
Rodrigues (eds), Non-discrimination law: Comparative perspectives, (The Hague/London/ 
Boston: Kluwer Law International 1999), pp. 313-330. 
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Figure 3: Three ways liability laws could influence food safety measures in firms 
 
 
In the following sections I discuss the available empirical evidence on each of 
these three possible influences of product liability law on food safety measures 
in the food industry. To supplement the literature consulted I have used informa-
tion from interviews conducted in the Netherlands with the food safety man-
agers of six large supermarket chains and a dairy, an officer of the Dutch 
Food Safety Authority (VWA), two directors of food certification bodies, an 
officer of the Association of Dutch Supermarkets (CBL) and two insurance offi-
cers. 
LIABILITY CLAIMS 
Civil liability claims may promote food safety. The assumption is that the food 
industry will try to avoid liability claims because such claims cost a lot of 
money, including the compensation awarded, the court costs, fees for attorneys 
and experts, and so on, all of which can be significant. Van Erp concludes that, 
when discussing the preventive effects of claims for damages, most authors re-
fer only to the direct costs of compensation.28 In addition to the financial costs, 
a liability claim could result in bad publicity, loss of reputation and possibly 
                                         
28   Judith Van Erp, „Naming en shaming in het contractenrecht? Het reputatie-effect van 
schadevergoedingen tussen ondernemingen‟, in: Van Boom, Giesen & Verheij (Eds), Ge-
drag en privaatrecht, pp. 153-180, supra note 20, at p. 153. 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
Product 
liability 
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Civil liabil-
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Liability 
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Food 
safety 
measures 
by food 
producers 
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General effects: 
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even loss of sales. Firms often do place a great value on their good reputation 
and try to settle disputes with other firms outside the courts for fear litigation 
may harm their reputation, with a great risk of losing their business partner.29  
Companies are assumed to be (broadly speaking) rational actors, seeking 
the optimum level of precaution in relation to the expected costs of liability 
claims. The greater the expected transaction costs of defending against liabil-
ity claims, the more powerful will be the deterrent effect of liability.30  
It is difficult to assess the number of liability claims with which food pro-
ducers are confronted. There are hardly any published court decisions in the 
Netherlands on product liability in relation to food products. Very few product 
liability cases actually come to court. Van Dam, in a survey up to the end of 
2002, found only six cases related to the European Product Liability Directive, 
two of which involved food.31 Product liability case law reviews and searches 
of case-law databases resulted in only three other cases involving liability for 
food products.32 In other words, I have only discovered five cases: three cases 
involving consumer claims and two cases involving a business-to-business dis-
pute. 
In a legal dispute, the injured person has to prove the defect, the damage 
and the causal relationship between defect and damage. This can be difficult, 
as is illustrated in the following Dutch cases. 
The first case involves plasma powder used as a binder for meat balls in 
soup.33 The court did not consider an abnormal smell and taste to be damage, 
and the product was found not to be defective or unsafe. The supplier of the 
plasma powder was not held to be liable because the company did not pro-
duce the plasma.  
The second case concerns a woman who contracted paratyphoid fever af-
ter eating an ice-cream.34 Experts concluded that a number of ice-creams sold 
by the defendant were contaminated with salmonella. The court found it be-
                                         
29   Alex Jettinghoff, Het komt zelden voor. Beheersing van klachten en geschillen in relaties 
tussen bedrijven. (Maastricht: Metajuridica publications 2001); Stewart Macaulay, „Non-
contractual relations in business: A preliminary study‟, 28 American Sociological Review 
(1963), pp. 55-67; Van Erp, „Naming en shaming in het contractenrecht? , supra note 28.  
30   Baram, „Liability and its influence‟, supra note 22, at p. 17. 
31   Cees Van Dam, „Dutch case law on the EU Product Liability Directive‟, in: Duncan 
Fairgrieve (ed.), Product liability in comparative perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press 2005), pp. 126-137. 
32   C.J.M. Van Doorn & W.H. Van Boom, „Productaansprakelijkheid en productveiligheid‟, 
Tijdschrift voor Consumentenrecht (2004) 3, pp. 100-106; C.J.M. Van Doorn & S.B. Pape, 
„Kroniek productaansprakelijkheid en productveiligheid 2005-2008‟, Tijdschrift voor 
Consumentenrecht en handelspraktijken (2009) 2, pp. 50-59. 
33  HR 22 September 2000, Vladeko vs VSCI (LJN: AA 7239). 
34  Boerman vs Alberto, Ktg. Zwolle 4 July and 5 December 2000. Van Dam, „Dutch case 
law on the EU Product Liability Directive‟, supra note 31, at p. 131-132. 
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yond reasonable doubt that the woman had bought one of the contaminated 
ice-creams. Paratyphoid can be caused by salmonella. The hospital found that 
the woman was infected by a salmonella microbe but did not make a more 
specific diagnosis. It was likely she contracted paratyphoid from eating the ice-
cream, but this was not beyond doubt. The court decided that the defendant 
had to prove that the woman would have suffered the same damage if she 
had not eaten the ice-cream. Under certain conditions the burden of proof is 
reversed; the defendant has to prove that there is no causality between the 
damage and the product. After this ruling the parties requested the court to 
drop the case. It is presumed that the parties reached a negotiated resolution. 
The third case deals with an eye injury caused by an exploding plastic 
bottle containing fresh orange juice.35 The bottle had no label and best-before 
date and was left in an open kitchen without refrigeration for five warm days 
in summer. The claim did not succeed because the judge ruled that a label and 
best-before date were not mandatory, the producer might ignore this type of 
storage and might expect the consumer to be aware of the risk that freshly 
squeezed orange juice will ferment in warm conditions. 
Case 4 relates to poisonous (Japanese) star-anise in an herbal tea, which 
caused health problems for people who drank the tea.36 The trading company 
that sold the star-anise was not considered to be the producer. However, the 
trading company should have taken more care and was ordered to pay 40% 
of the costs.  
This case law illustrates that it can be difficult for a victim to pursue a suc-
cessful liability claim because the defect and the causal relation between de-
fect and damage is hard to prove, the consumer is expected to have consider-
able knowledge of commodities, and because some products are bought from 
someone who is not considered to be the producer. Based on the limited num-
ber of court cases and the poor success rate of claimants in these cases, it 
would seem to be rather implausable that liability claims give business much 
incentive to take precautionary measures to prevent food safety incidents. 
In interviews, the Dutch food safety managers of supermarket chains and 
the food industry did not regard the fear of liability claims as an important 
incentive to adopt food safety measures.  
                                         
35  Rb Maastricht 21 March 2002 (zaaknummer 67354, TvC 2003/1, p. 65). Van Doorn & 
Van Boom, „Productaansprakelijkheid en productveiligheid‟, supra note 32, at p. 100. 
Another case involves an injury from the top of a lemonade bottle, which broke off 
(Leebeek vs Vrumona, HR 24 December 1993; NJ 1994 nr 214). This case has been 
omitted because it relates more to packaging than food. 
36  Rb Zwolle 26 July 2006 (LJN: AZ0545) Sterrenmix. 
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In the UK, Hutter and Jones studied the external influences on risk manage-
ment in food firms.37 The influence attributed to lawyers is low. When inter-
viewed, managers of food firms rarely mention the possibility of compensation 
claims or civil actions. Hutter and Jones expected a greater impact, given the 
debate about the compensation culture. This finding suggests that liability law 
claims do not have a strong, direct influence on food safety measurements in 
firms in the UK either. 
In the United States there is more case law on product liability in relation to 
food products. Recently, law suits against the fast-food industry and its respon-
sibility for obesity have attracted attention.38 Even in the United States, though, 
most cases of food-born illness do not result in legal action. Buzby and Frenzen 
estimated that in the United States far fewer than 0.01% of cases are brought 
to court.39 Buzby and Frenzen studied 294 food-born illness lawsuits between 
1988 and 1997. Not all of these lawsuits resulted in a court decision; nearly 
40% were settled, mediated or arbitrated out of court. Many settlements in-
clude an agreement that the monetary payment and other details shall remain 
confidential. In 32% of the cases that did result in a court decision, financial 
compensation was awarded (median award $25 000).  
The actual costs of liability claims are unknown because out-of-court settle-
ments are common in the United States, the United Kingdom and the Nether-
lands. The amount of financial compensation in such settlements is not disclosed. 
Explaining the small number of court cases 
The small number of court cases can be explained by obstacles placed before 
victims who seek redress and the incentives for defendants to settle claims out 
of court. Buzby and Frenzen point to the high information and transaction costs 
of pursuing a food poisoning lawsuit, and the expected poor monetary com-
pensation in their explanation of the small number of litigants.40 
Potential plaintiffs face several obstacles in seeking to mobilise liability 
law. Some legal provisions prohibit them making a successful legal claim. They 
                                         
37  Bridget M. Hutter & Clive J. Jones, „From government to governance: External influences 
on business risk management‟, 1 Regulation and Governance (2007), pp. 27-45. 
38   Ronald Adams, „Fast Food, Obesity, and Tort Reform: An Examination of Industry Respon-
sibility for Public Health‟, 110 Business and Society Review (2005) 3, pp. 297-320 (doi: 
10.1111/j.00453609.2005.00017.x). 
39   Jean C. Buzby & Paul D. Frenzen, „Food safety and product liability‟, 24 Food Policy 
(1999) 6, pp. 637-651. 
40   Buzby & Frenzen, „Food safety and product liability‟, supra note 40, at p. 648. 
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also have to face the general obstacles that (individual) complainants expe-
rience when seeking to mobilize the law.41 
Claims related to food-born diseases are limited because: 
- The consumer must be able to attribute the illness or damage to a specific 
product and producer; 
- Proving causality between product and illness is often difficult; 
- In many cases there will not be substantial damage or injury, whereas this 
is required to make a legal liability claim; 
- European Union law does not allow for claims after ten years. 
 
Faure and Hartlief set out a fictive case of someone who contracts variant 
Creuzfeldt-Jacob disease (mad cow disease) to illustrate some of these prob-
lems.42 In this case there is severe damage, but is this a case of product liabil-
ity? Until recently, EU product liability law only applied to agricultural produce 
after processing, while in the case under consideration the cause of the disease 
may date back to before these product liability rules came into force. Is this a 
knowable risk? Causality will be hard to prove (variant CJ disease is caused by 
eating veal, but which veal from which producer? And maybe one can contract 
vCJ disease from some other source?). vCJ disease has a long incubation pe-
riod (i.e., the time between consumption and the appearance of disease symp-
toms), while a claim is no longer possible ten years after the product was put 
on the market. 
Liability claims are hampered because people often fail to notice the de-
fect in food. Moreover, it turns out to be difficult to make a case. In an inter-
view, a chief executive officer for food safety and consumer health in an inter-
national food retail company, who used to handle consumer complaints, gives 
the example of a consumer complaining about eating a drawing pin that was 
in a packet of potato crisps. The defence is simple: drawing pins are often kept 
in a cup in the kitchen and the crisps fall into the cup. The defence is that this is 
how the pin ended up in the crisps. It could have been in the crisps, but that is 
not likely, especially if the producer has got a metal detector at the end of the 
crisp production line, in conformity with the supermarket‟s requirements for 
                                         
41  Erhard Blankenburg, Mobilisierung des Rechts. Eine Einführung in die Rechtssoziologie, 
(Berlin etc: Springer 1995); Richard E. Miller & Austin Sarat, „Grievances, claims and dis-
putes: assessing the adversary culture‟,15 Law and Society Review (1981), pp. 525-566; 
Bert Niemeijer &  Carolien Klein Haarhuis, „Hoeveel recht kunt u betalen? Over verklarin-
gen van geschilgedrag en het gebruik van procedures‟, in: Van Boom, Giesen & Verheij, 
Gedrag en privaatrecht, pp. 537-559, supra note 20. 
42  Faure & Hartlief, Verzekerbaarheid van nieuwe gezondheidsrisico’s, supra note 22, at 
pp. 53-55. See also Matteo Ferrari, Risk  Perception, Culture, and Legal Change (Ashgate 
2009), at pp. 159-161. 
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suppliers. In that case, the consumer will have to prove the pin was in the crisps 
and this is almost impossible. This illustrates how hard it can be to bring a suc-
cessful lawsuit to court in cases of unsafe food. However, it also shows an in-
centive for food producers and retailers to take measures that could eventually 
be used in a court defence (in the above case the requirement to have a metal 
detector at the end of the production line). Another strategy often used to pre-
clude liability is to warn the consumer on the label (e.g. this product may con-
tain nuts; this product should be properly cooked before consumption). 
A consumer will notice a defect like a pin in the crisps. Other defects are 
relatively invisible. Imagine someone with cancer: it is unclear whether this is 
caused by carcinogens in food (and which foods? Peanut butter? Deep-frying?). 
And most likely cancer is not caused by just one type of product but the sum of 
many foods consumed during a life-time. The same holds for eating veal and 
risking variant Creuzfeldt-Jacob disease. A consumer cannot distinguish a de-
fect or risky product from a healthy one. In situations like these, liability law 
does little to help the consumer. 
An individual consumer is a one-shotter without experience in making a lia-
bility claim. On the other hand, the defendant is more likely to be a repeat 
player that has had, and anticipates having, repeated litigation and can af-
ford specialised legal assistance and a strategic handling of the case.43 In 
general, individual people do not go to court very readily because they lack 
the resources and motives to do so. A so-called individual rights strategy, 
where legal rights are granted but have to be mobilized by the action of the 
victim, is known to generate only a relatively small number of legal claims. 
Most victims just leave it at that. 
Claims from business to business (a shop versus a trading company, a 
trading company versus an industry or an insurer versus a producer) are more 
likely to be brought, but even in these cases there are many incentives to settle 
out of court. 
Besides the obstacles to victims asking for redress, the small number of 
court cases may be explained in terms of the incentives for defendant firms to 
settle claims out of court. Most retail shops and manufacturers will deal with 
customer claims by offering a new product and some extras (like a box carry-
ing a broad selection of crisps and snacks or some other gift) to make up for 
the damage and inconvenience, regardless of the legal merits of the claim. This 
keeps customers satisfied and prevents the complaint from developing into a 
legal claim. Claims from supplier and customer firms are usually settled be-
                                         
43  Marc Galanter, „Why the “haves” come out ahead: Speculations on the limits of legal 
change‟, 9 Law and Society Review (1974) 1, pp. 96-160. 
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cause litigation will disrupt the ongoing business relationship.44 By choosing to 
settle a claim outside the courtroom the defendant firm avoids litigation costs 
and reputational damage. 
Van Dam assumes that producers, importers and their liability insurers in 
the Netherlands are inclined to settle liability claims out of court in order to 
prevent the development of case law by the courts.45 According to Dutch and 
German insurers, 90% of the claims are settled out of court.46 Apart from a 
small number of liability court cases, the impact of a court case seems to exert 
only a minor degree of deterrence. Van Erp finds no signs that the loss of a 
good reputation reflects on third parties (in other words, the relationship with 
other firms is not endangered).47 Information about damages is usually un-
known to third parties, in part the parties agree to observe confidentiality in 
respect of the deal. 
US plaintiffs are more likely to litigate, more likely to win their case and to 
receive generous compensation compared to plaintiffs in European countries, 
such as the UK and the Netherlands.48 However, Buzby et al. conclude that 
even in the Unites States, product liability law provides only weak incentives 
for firms to produce safer food. Defendants have incentives to settle out of 
court to avoid additional attorney fees, delays, negative impact on the firm‟s 
or the product‟s reputation, and a poor track record.49 
Because of the obstacles victims face when they claim compensation and 
the factors encouraging them to deal with cases outside the courtroom, it is not 
to be expected that liability claims will have any major preventive effect in the 
near future. 
DOES LIABILITY INSURANCE CONTRIBUTE TO FOOD SAFETY? 
As already stated, claims for compensation are not an important incentive for 
food manufacturers to take preventive measures. What is the role of insurance? 
According to Meidinger „the insurance industry […] has had a powerful and 
sustained interest in controlling the risks that it was assuring against.‟ The in-
surance industry has propelled one of the first companies to make a business 
                                         
44  Jettinghoff, Het komt zelden voor, supra note 29; Macaulay, „Non-contractual relations in 
business‟, supra note 29. 
45  Van Dam, „Dutch case law on the EU Product Liability Directive‟, supra note 31, at 
p. 137. 
46  Report from the Commission on the application of Directive 85/374 on Liability for 
Defective Products, COM (2000) 893 final, at p. 10. 
47  Van Erp, „Naming en shaming in het contractenrecht?, supra note 28.  
48  Buzby & Frenzen, „Food safety and product liability‟, supra note 40, at p. 647. 
49  Buzby & Frenzen, „Food safety and product liability‟, supra note 40; Buzby, Frenzen & 
Rasco, Product liability and microbial foodborne illness, supra note 21. 
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out of product safety testing and standard setting, Underwriters Laboratories 
(UL). Insured parties were often required to use UL certified products.50 Skees 
et al. have high hopes for improving food safety: „Under the right conditions, 
an insurance underwriter could be more effective than a government meat in-
spector in getting a processor to change their behaviour in the desired fashion.‟ 
Insurance companies are exposed to risk and will have incentives to assure that 
systems are in place to mitigate food safety risks. Since rate discounts will be 
possible, plant managers should be cooperative .51  
Others expect the role of the insurance industry to be counterproductive. 
Hutter and Jones suggest that the influence of insurance companies could be 
problematic (without further explanation).52 Buzby et al. argue that most food 
firms in the United States are insured and insurers pay losses and costs of 
litigation and damages; this limits the immediate incentives for firms to produce 
safer food.53 
Faure and Van Boom reviewed the literature to examine what insurance 
companies do to prevent the moral hazard (i.e, when insured parties don‟t 
bother to control risks because the insurance covers the damage).54 Their re-
search did not focus on food producers. However, Faure and Van Boom con-
clude that insurance companies on occasion estimate the risk and establish the 
premiums at the start. During the course of insurance contract, however, insur-
ance companys seldom check on the actual risks. Consequently, they do not 
know whether moral hazard exists. Some insurance companies do not differen-
tiate premiums. Even after an accident premiums are not always increased. The 
passive attitude of insurance companies even results in an increased risk of ac-
cidents in case of medical liability and directors‟ liability, according to Faure 
and Van Boom. 
Hutter and Jones explored the external pressures on risk management in 
the food retail sector.55 They asked managers of food firms what food safety 
risks they perceive and what external pressures on risk management they ex-
perience. The most important external pressure came from local environmental 
health officers, followed by consumers. Although some authors expect that 
                                         
50 Meidinger, „Private Import Safety Regulation‟, supra note 26, at p 234. 
51   Jerry R. Skees, Aleta Botts & Kimberly A. Zeuli, „The potential for recall insurance to im-
prove food safety‟, 4 The International Food and Agribusiness Management Review (2001) 
1, pp. 99-111, at p. 100, 110. 
52   Hutter & Jones,‟From government to governance, supra note 37, at p. 14. 
53   Buzby, Frenzen and Rasco, Product liability and microbial foodborne illness, supra note 
20, at p. 9. 
54   Michael Faure & Willem Hendrik Van Boom, „Hoe houdbaar zijn gedragsveronderstellin-
gen in verzekeringsrecht en -economie?‟,  in: Van Boom, Giesen, Verheij, Gedrag en pri-
vaatrecht, pp. 305-339, supra note 21. 
55  Hutter & Jones,‟From government to governance, supra note 37, at p. 14. 
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insurance companies are important in encouraging food safety measures,56 
most respondents did not see insurance companies as an important incentive. 
Only 15% of managers in medium and large-size businesses answered that in-
surance companies have a „strong influence‟. 
More than half of the firms in the Hutter and Jones investigation were in-
sured against food hygiene and food safety incidents. Managers in small firms 
assessed the influence of insurances as smaller than managers in big com-
panies. About 20% of the managers said they had received information on 
food safety from their insurance company. Only one firm reported ever having 
been inspected by his insurer. The experts thought it unlikely that insurance 
companies would figure prominently as an influence on food safety and hy-
giene standards. Some expected that insurers would become more important in 
future. Others had serious doubts as to the potential influence of insurers on 
measures to promote food safety, comments ranging from a view that insurance 
companies are not very good at quantifying risk, with others being especially 
concerned about moral hazard problems. A respondent said: „Insurance is the 
enemy of the good as it is designed to average out loss resulting in the good 
not being rewarded and the bad not being punished‟.57 
In my own interviews, a respondent from the Dutch Food Safety Authority 
and two directors of Third party food certification agencies did take the view 
that liability law and liability insurance had some impact. Nevertheless, they 
did not expect insurance companies really to review food safety measures in 
the firms they insure because they lack the knowledge to do so. One of the in-
terviewed certifiers states that the insurance companies just look at ISO certi-
fication.  
The application form issued by an insurance company working in the Neth-
erlands did not contain specific questions for the food industry (although speci-
fic questions were included for high-risk economic sectors, such as construction 
firms and dentists). The application form contains questions on the certification 
of production processes and routines, quality control, recommendations, warn-
ings or prescription by supervisory bodies, previous liability claims, input and 
output controls and product traceability. Many detailed questions focus on 
possible risks to employees.  
Respondents from an insurance broker said the insurance company employs 
an extended questionnaire that firms must complete in order to be accepted. 
They said that food safety management is included in the conditions for accept-
ing a firm. Submitting the document describing the firm‟s general trading condi-
tions is also part of the application procedure and insurance agents visit the 
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firm that is applying for insurance. They check the company‟s premises (order, 
tidiness), the reputation of the entrepreneur, the impression they have of the 
personnel, and the risks that might be involved. If the insurance agents find the 
premises unhygienic or the equipment very old, they said that the application 
procedure is terminated. An example was provided from some snack outlets 
with obviously unclean oil filters. 
Examination of the general conditions of liability insurance for companies in 
the Netherlands, obtained from four insurance companies, revealed that some 
insurance policies exclude liability in the United States and Canada. One com-
pany excluded liability for damage caused by or related to transmissible 
spongiform encephalopathy (TSE), such as BSE or variant Creuzfeldt-Jacob dis-
ease. 
In sum, some factors point to a positive impact of insurance on preventive 
food safety measures whereas other factors indicate a negative impact, as 
summarised in the following figure. 
 
Figure 4: Could liability insurance further food safety measures? 
Yes No 
- by way of reduction in premium - insufficient knowledge with insurance 
companies 
- by conditions of insurance - reducing financial incentive to 
produce safe food (moral hazard) 
- by information and assistance from 
insurance company with reducing food 
safety risks 
- insurance company does not interact 
with food safety officers at insured 
firm 
 
Insurance companies do not seem to encourage prevention of food safety risks; 
in some cases the effect is even rather counterproductive. Insurance companies 
do not appear to make the fullest use of their opportunities to further preven-
tion.  
GENERAL EFFECT OF LIABILITY LAWS 
What are the effects of liability laws on firms in general, apart from liability 
claims? Do liability rules induce firms to take preventive measures to assure the 
production of safe food? 
In the United Kingdom, the introduction of the principle of due diligence un-
der the Food Safety Act 1990 is said to have encouraged firms to establish 
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private food safety regulations.58 British retailers have been required to take 
all reasonable steps to ensure that the food they sell is safe. Previously, the 
retailers had only to prove that the food was not compromised while under 
their control and the manufacturer was held liable for the rest. This shift of the 
legal responsibility for safe food downstream in the supply chain makes food 
retailers ultimately responsible for the safety of the products. This includes the 
verification of technical performance at sites producing retailer-branded food 
products. For a due diligence defence against food safety offences, a retailer 
has to demonstrate that all reasonable precautions have been taken. All major 
British supermarket chains have developed initiatives to ensure a certain quality 
of retail food products by committing suppliers to a specified set of standards. 
A quality assurance scheme was set up in the British meat industry. The British 
Retail Consortium developed a set of food safety standards and retailers re-
quire their suppliers to be certified under these standards.The aims of the BRC 
Global Standards are to improve supplier standards and consistency and 
avoid product failure, and to provide concise information to assist with a due 
diligence defence.59 
Similarly, in the Netherlands the introduction of a stricter liability regime by 
the European Union seems to have resulted in fear for the consequences. This 
new liability law encouraged the development of third-party certification 
schemes, such as quality assurance certification in the dairy industry and retail-
led certification. The Dutch supermarkets feared possible claims and litigation 
and they tried to cover themselves by tightening supplier contracts. Insurance 
companies raised the premiums. As one respondent put it: „Looking back I would 
say product liability was enlarged out of all proportion; after ten years, there 
have not been any serious liability cases.‟ 
In the United States liability law plays a less significant role as an incentive 
for quality assurance, according to Henson and Caswell.60 
Fairman and Yapp interviewed small and medium-sized food industry 
enterprises (SMEs) in the UK and found that most SMEs were unable to assess 
their own compliance with food safety regulations (as defined by the enforce-
                                         
58   Buzby & Frenzen, „Food safety and product liability‟, supra note 39, at p. 648; Julie 
Caswell, „Valuing the benefits and costs of improved safety and nutrition‟, 42 The Austra-
lian Journal of Agriculture and Resource Economics (1998) 4, pp. 409-424, at p. 416; 
Henson & Caswell, „Food safety regulation‟, supra note 6, at p. 594; Henson & Northen, 
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ment agencies) due to a lack of knowledge of the legal requirements.61 The 
compliance process proved to be highly reactive, with the businesses respond-
ing to external intervention rather than initiating action. Non-compliance was 
not considered an option: to comply with regulations was not a decision but 
rather a norm. So at least these SMEs did not act as fully rational economic 
actors, weighing the costs and benefits of compliance and non-compliance, as 
economic theory assumes. For that reason it is very unlikely that liability rules 
(which seem to be even more abstract, general and unknown than food safety 
regulations) will have a direct effect at the level of individual SMEs in the food 
industry.  
The interviews I have conducted in the past few years with quality mana-
gers from Dutch supermarkets also suggest that liability laws have a limited 
impact. Two respondents from the Dutch dairy industry say that the firm takes 
several measures to assure the production of safe food, not because of the 
fear of being held liable for damages and injuries caused by unsafe food, but 
primarily because they fear loss of reputation and sales in case unsafe food is 
sold. As a quality manager of a Dutch supermarket chain said in an interview: 
„Product liability is not important in product recall. My name is on the product 
and whenever there is something wrong with the product, I will recall it. It‟s just 
as simple as that‟. However, my respondents, people responsible for food safe-
ty and compliance with the law, are not involved in matters of legal liability or 
insurance, which is something for the legal department to deal with.  
CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has identified a number of obstacles that may exist to the use of 
liability law to improve food safety. Much of the evidence presented in this 
paper is rather anecdotal. However, the assumption that liability laws make 
firms sensitive to preventing food safety risks has been found too optimistic. In 
particular, small and medium-sized firms often do not even have the necessary 
information about their obligations. This will be different in large firms, but the 
information on liability laws is available to other company personnel and de-
partments than the food safety and quality management. 
The extent to which liability law and insurance does play a role in promot-
ing food safety and food hygiene is difficult to establish. The most promising 
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influence of liability law is the general effect of shifting legal responsibilities. 
Liability could have a positive effect on the development of a culture where 
firms take responsibility for food safety. And this responsibility may induce 
firms to take precautionary measures. Fear of reputational damage seems to 
be more effective here than fear of liability claims. 
Each of the issues identified requires further research and empirical study. 
It is necessary to extend the available economic and legal perspectives on 
product liability to a more sociological approach by studying the actual effect 
of legal liability on company decisions. We should not study theoretical or per-
ceived costs and benefits only, as in an economic calculation model. But our 
analysis needs to include the motives of firms and social relations. We should 
study empirically why food firms do adopt measures, or why they do not have 
a food safety management system. Can this be attributed to expected costs, 
perceived consumer demand, legal requirements, image and reputation build-
ing? We have to look at the impact of social relations between different actors 
inside the company (between the head office and local plants, between the le-
gal experts and the food safety experts) and between the firm and suppliers, 
customers, policy-makers, inspectors, certification agencies and insurers. 
 
